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Triton Trimaran

The Triton trimaran research ship was a technology demonstrator ship for the Royal Navy's future surface combatant (FSC)

Vosper Thornycroft

Gardline Marine Sciences

44 (14 civilian crew + 30 officers)

Gross Tonnage

Diesel electric propulsion

2 × Paxman 12VP185 2MW diesel engines

1 × five-bladed composite propeller

2 × 350kW electric side thrusters

The Triton trimaran research ship was a technology demonstrator ship for the Royal Navy’s future surface combatant (FSC) frigate requirement, due to enter service from 2013 and replace the Type 23 frigates. Triton is the world’s largest motor powered trimaran (triple-hulled) vessel, with a length of 90m and beam of 22m. QinetiQ (formerly DERA, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) funded the design and manufacture of the vessel, to be used to quantify the structural and seakeeping performance of the trimaran.

In August 1998, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) awarded a contract to Vosper Thornycroft to construct the Trimaran, called RV (research vessel) Triton. The vessel was launched in May 2000 and delivered in August 2000. Triton then began a two-year risk reduction trials programme for the UK MoD and the US Department of Defense.

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Following completion of the trials programme, Triton has been used as a trials platform for other QinetiQ technologies including the composite propeller.

In January 2005, Triton was sold to Gardline Marine Sciences, a UK company based in Great Yarmouth, Norfolk. Triton was used for hydrographic survey work for the civil hydrography programme (CHP) on behalf of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The vessel was fitted with a sensor suite which includes the Kongsberg Simrad EM1002 multibeam echo-sounder, a GPS attitude / heading system, surface navigation and ultra-short baseline sub-surface acoustic tracking system, Gardline Voyager5 integrated survey system and Caris post-processing system.

Triton was the launch vessel for the QinetiQ 1 programme to break the world altitude record for a manned balloon. The target altitude of 25 miles (132,000ft) would take the two pilots into the stratosphere.

The giant helium-filled balloon had a nine-acre area and was as high as the Empire State Building. An attempt on the record, in September 2003, was aborted after an 8m tear appeared in the helium balloon envelope during launch.

Triton has become a patrol vessel since it was chartered to the Australian Customs Service in December 2006. It has been deployed in northern waters of Australia to work along with other customs and Royal Australian Navy patrol boats.

The vessel has been modified to provide additional accommodation and also fitted with two 0.50-calibre machine guns to perform patrol operations. The vessel is also equipped with two 7.3m high-speed rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs). The boats are powered by Evinrude outboard motors and have the range of 200nm at 30kt speed. Following the modifications in the UK and Singapore shipyards, it was delivered to the customs in January 2007.

Trimaran hullform trials programme

The trials programme to determine the suitability of the trimaran hullform began in October 2000 and included operations in a variety of sea states and at differing speeds. Triton successfully completed replenishment at sea (RAS), structural loading and seakeeping trials, landing and take-off trials by a Royal Navy Lynx mk8 helicopter, towing operations and small boat launch and recovery. It also took part in trials with the US Coastguard. The trials were concluded in September 2002, successfully proving that the design could operate in exactly the same way as an equivalent mono-hull vessel.

Advantages of trimaran design

The advantages of a trimaran hullform over conventional mono-hulls are thought to be: reduced costs, reduced signature, significantly less drag increased speed, increased length, giving greater stability, and more room for the upper deck, which could be used for the flight deck as well as hangars for helicopters and extra armaments.

Applications

The Trimaran development has been driven by frigate type applications. Concept studies have been carried out for other roles including offshore patrol, concept studies for future vessel development – for example, the mini landing platform helicopter ship (mini LPH), fast roll-on / roll-off rapid deployment support ships, and air-capable stealth vessels.

Demonstrator vessel contruction

The demonstrator is built at two thirds the size of a full-scale warship and although not armed it is capable of carrying containerised Naval military systems at sea. The 90m length of the Trimaran demonstrator meets the structural constraints of the ship’s plating and longitudinal stiffening. The main hulls and bridge deck are of steel construction.

A comprehensive ballast system accommodates trials in various operating conditions. The structure will accept containerised trials equipment. The flight deck strength is to be rated to accommodate a Lynx helicopter and be capable of operating unmanned aerial vehicles.

Provision is made for future electric propulsion trials involving the installation of exchange permanent magnetic main motors, a battery/fuel cell compartment, and flight deck and engine room sites for at-sea tests of future gas turbine alternators. The demonstrator will accommodate integrated technology masts.

The engines exhaust between the hulls as a method of reducing the thermal signature of the ship. Low noise and radar signatures are achieved using commercially available materials and services.

Navigation and communications

The Triton navigation suite included Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine Bridgemaster E S-band and X-band flat screen radars with ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids), two Northrop Grumman (Litton) LMX400 GPS receivers, Furuno Loran-C receiver, Northrop Grumman electronic chart system and Skipper GDS 101 echo sounder.

Satellite communications systems include Northrop Grumman (Litton) INMARSAT SAT-C and INMARSAT SAT-M and Nera INMARSAT SAT-B.

Trials instrumentation system

The demonstrator had two laboratories. One laboratory housed the Trials Instrumentation System (TIS) which collected data including wind speed and direction, temperature, wave height and ship’s motion, with the other for general trials purposes. The TIS system can record over 400 channels of data at sampling rates of either 20Hz, 200Hz or 2,000Hz. All the data is time-stamped from a GPS sourced time synchronisation signal. TIS sensors include: Miros WAVEX wave height radar, TSK wave height radar, Trimble AGPS system, AGI windspeed and environmental monitoring system.

The propulsion system consists of two Paxman 12VP185 2MW diesel generators and two 350kW electric side thrusters with a single central screw. QinetiQ has replaced the fixed pitch propeller with a new composite propeller. The five-bladed composite propeller has a diameter of 2.9m. The use of the lighter composite allows for thicker blades which reduces vibration and consequently acoustic signature. Dowty Propellers manufactured the blades and Wärtsilä Propulsion the nickel aluminium bronze hub.

Accommodation

Accommodation for 14 civilian crew and up to 30 customs boarding party officers is provided in 48 berths. The other onboard features include a first aid centre, health screening and quarantine isolation area and secure holding areas.

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Lessons from the Littoral Combat Ship

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The military-industrial complex “has more tentacles than an octopus,” and its “dimensions are almost infinite.” So wrote Sen. William Proxmire in his excoriating 1970 book Report from Wasteland . He described the military-industrial complex (i.e., the deep interconnection of the military, politicians, and industry) as a “military-contract treadmill” that had unwarranted influence over U.S. politics.

Does this treadmill still exist half a century later?

The littoral combat ship can answer that question. It has been plagued by problems since its conception in 2001. Uncharitably dubbed the “little crappy ship” by its detractors, the program has faced cost overruns, delays, mechanical failures , and questions over the platforms’ survivability in high-intensity combat. Each of the 23 commissioned littoral combat ships cost around $500 million to build, with astronomical operating costs adding to the program’s hefty price tag. While the ships themselves are currently facing the prospect of decommissioning and replacement , and many will not be sad to see them go, the program has one saving grace — it offers some important lessons about the American defense industrial base.

The U.S. Navy’s over-reliance on a small number of shipyards, combined with a powerful lobbying effort by prime defense contractors, meant that congressional efforts to remove funding in the early stages of the program — citing concerns that were ultimately proved correct — were doomed to fail. The acquisition of the littoral combat ship is an example of the military-industrial complex in action, and one that should not be forgotten. While close working relationships between the services, policymakers, and contractors can be beneficial, blunders like the littoral combat ship can undermine U.S. military capabilities while wasting resources that could be better used elsewhere.

The Beginnings of the Littoral Combat Ship

Following the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the threat from the Soviet Union meant that the U.S. Navy lost its great raison d’etre . The lack of a clearly defined naval mission in the 1990s, combined with the same budgetary pressures faced by the other services as defense funding fell, meant that the U.S. Navy needed a new purpose. This came in the form of the doctrine of network-centric warfare , which emerged in the late 1990s and gave key roles to the U.S. Navy in maintaining a global presence via seabasing and ensuring access to contested regions. Network-centric warfare gave prominence to the idea of small, light, and fast “nodes” that connected together in conflict scenarios, and this meant that the U.S. Navy needed to move away from its traditional platforms — huge, complex, and multipurpose ships. Furthermore, network-centric warfare focused more on projecting power ashore, meaning that ships that could operate in coastal waters were required.

Even though the United States no longer faced an adversary with substantial naval forces, the U.S. Navy could not focus solely on presence and power projection. During the Gulf War, the USS Tripoli (an Iwo Jima-class amphibious assault ship) and the USS Princeton (a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser) struck floating mines in the Persian Gulf, injuring seven personnel and causing damage to the vessels. Although both ships were soon back in action, the episode highlighted the need for mine countermeasures vessels, and gave Congress ammunition to press the service to procure specialized ships for that mission despite the Navy’s reluctance to do so. The 14 Avenger-class minesweepers built in the late 1980s and early 1990s were unreliable and plagued by mechanical problems. One of the vessels, the USS Devastator, spent so much time moored stationary in Bahrain for repairs that sailors jokingly referred to it as “ Building 6 .” This was coupled with the impending retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, small general-purpose escort ships that made a significant contribution to U.S. maritime presence. One of the frigates had also struck a mine in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War.

During the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review process, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made clear that the U.S. military needed to improve its ability to tackle anti-access/area denial threats and project power in contested theaters. His office quietly informed U.S. Navy leaders that they needed to include a small surface combatant in any plans they put forward. The new chief of naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark, did just that. In November 2001, the U.S. Navy announced its new DD(X) Future Surface Combatant Program , which encompassed the acquisition of three new classes of ship: DD(X), a destroyer for precision long-range strike; CG(X), a cruiser for missile and air defense; and a littoral combat ship that could operate in shallow-draft and coastal waters.

Rather than being a multi-mission ship like its larger brethren, the littoral combat ship would be equipped to perform one primary mission at any given time. This could be achieved either by individual ships focusing on one mission throughout their service or having their mission orientation changed by swapping out a modular mission package. Not only did these modules mean that a cheaply built hull could be repurposed for different missions, but they also meant that the littoral combat ship program promised, in essence, to solve all of the U.S. Navy’s problems. The ship could be tasked to perform a wide range of missions (including surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare) while adding to maritime presence, projecting power, and assisting with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, all in coastal waters and with fewer personnel per ship. The concept of the “hybrid sailor” was built into the littoral combat ship from the start, and it was designed to operate with “ mission-critical manning ” whereby the ship could deliver its objectives with a minimal number of personnel aboard. A littoral combat ship would nominally have a core crew of 40 plus 15 to 20 extra for a given module, compared to a crew of around 200 for a similar-sized frigate, providing a much cheaper option when it came to crewing costs. Clark declared the littoral combat ship his top priority, and Rumsfeld approved the request’s inclusion in the Department of Defense’s budget submission for Fiscal Year 2003.

Primes Pressure Policymakers  

The U.S. Navy stated that it planned to set up multiple competitions among industry teams for each of the three DD(X) programs. In May 2004, contracts for the littoral combat ship were awarded to two teams, one led by Lockheed Martin and the other by General Dynamics. A third team, led by Raytheon, was unsuccessful. Each team was thus headed by a prime defense contractor, but also included smaller shipbuilders. General Dynamics brought in Austal USA, and Lockheed Martin brought in Bollinger Shipyards and Marinette Marine. The Lockheed Martin team was awarded a seven-month, $46.5 million contract, while the General Dynamics team was awarded a 16-month, $78.8 million contract. Each team would complete a final system design of a littoral combat ship, called a Flight 0 ship, and build a prototype. The Lockheed Martin team would design and build the LCS-1 or Freedom-class ship, based on a steel monohull. The General Dynamics team would work on the LCS-2 or Independence-class ship, based on an aluminum trimaran hull. The U.S. Navy stated that both designs met the program’s key performance parameters.

The U.S. Navy initially expected to test one prototype of each design, and then downselect to a single variant for Flight I production thereafter, but this plan proved to be unworkable. Both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics argued that building a single Flight 0 prototype and then idling their design teams and production lines until a decision on the winner was made would be excessively expensive. This led to the addition of another Flight 0 prototype each before the downselect. However, this plan allowed only a very short time for the U.S. Navy to comparatively test the two designs, as the time needed for the production of a second prototype pushed the construction too close to the planned date for transition to Flight I production. The final budget submissions, as reflected in the National Defense Authorization Acts for FY2005 and FY2006 , thus called for more Flight 0 seaframes to be built (nine in the FY2005 plan, raised to 14 in FY2006) before the final downselect decision, with the option to put both designs into production.

In the summer of 2004, the House Armed Services Committee attempted to remove funding for the littoral combat ship from the FY2005 defense budget, citing a number of substantive concerns about the program:

The committee continues to have concerns about the lack of a rigorous analysis of alternative concepts for performance of the LCS mission, the justification for the force structure sought by the Navy, and whether the program’s acquisition strategy is necessary to meet an urgent operational need. … [T]he committee is concerned about the Navy’s ability to resolve these issues before committing to the design for the LCS and beginning construction of the first ship.

The head of the projection forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, argued that the littoral combat ship concept was “immature” and convinced the House of Representatives to make the cut in funding. However, the U.S. Navy argued that any cuts to the DD(X) program would be disastrous for the defense industrial base. Naval acquisition executive John Young warned publicly that any funding cuts and acquisition delays would lead to “substantial layoffs” at the shipyards, leading to a loss of skilled workers that would “come back to haunt the Navy” when shipbuilding resumed in the future. In order to allay these fears, and address concerns about the effect a cut would have on naval force structure, Bartlett proposed funding two additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers instead.

This threat of funding removal came at the same time as the U.S. Navy’s planned announcement of the results of the downselect to the final two Flight 0 teams who would build their prototypes. The service argued that they could not fully make the case for the program’s maturity until the two finalists had been announced. The contractors responded quickly. Lockheed Martin, along with its teammates Bollinger Shipyards and Marinette Marine, launched a lobbying campaign , intended both to tilt the downselect decision in their favor and to rally Congressional support for the littoral combat ship program as a whole. The company ran advertisements in newspapers and defense magazines touting their expertise and track record — including taglines like “Don’t just look at what we say. Look at what we do.” — and blanketed the metro stations serving Capitol Hill and the Pentagon with posters pushing for the littoral combat ship as a program, with slogans like “Littoral Dominance Assured.” Lockheed Martin also planned a trade-show style display in the Capitol, including scale mock-ups of the ship and its modules.

The House’s threat caused a small showdown in Congress, as the Senate had voted to keep the littoral combat ship program fully funded. In the end, the congressional authorization conference committee report simply “note[d] the concerns” that Bartlett had expressed. The final spending authorization bill actually ended up fully funding the construction of the two littoral combat ship prototypes at a higher level than had been proposed by the U.S. Navy, the House, or the Senate in the original authorizations.

Lessons for the Future

The military-industrial complex is not a bad thing per se , despite the almost exclusively pejorative use of the term. If the services, the contractors, and the politicians can all work together, that can make the whole acquisition process smoother and allow the military to get the capabilities it needs with fewer snags. Congressional representatives are doing their jobs in the eyes of their constituents when they push for production contracts in their areas, given the jobs and money that flow into the communities surrounding sites like shipyards. However, problems arise when the influence of the primes over policymakers leads to the acquisition of platforms that are unnecessary or simply do not work. This not only wastes money that could be better spent on other capabilities, but also impacts upon whether the United States can credibly face threats around the world. An expensive ship that cannot perform its mission does not bode well for the U.S. naval balance with China, or for America’s ability to project power and defend its interests in far-off and contested theaters.

The beginnings of the littoral combat ship program provide a clear-cut example of prime contractor influence. The U.S. Navy cited concerns about the future of the defense industrial base and its skilled workers when answering congressional queries on the program’s funding. Within the littoral combat ship program itself, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics were able to successfully argue first for additional Flight 0 prototypes, then for both designs to be put into production, and finally for the program to not only continue to be funded but to receive even more money. The structure of the prototype competition required such a large level of expenditure that the contractors could easily claim that their businesses would be significantly undermined if they did not get a production contract out of the process. Lockheed Martin, in particular, took full advantage of its lobbying teams to push Congress in the right direction.

The littoral combat ship is, of course, not the sole example of the U.S. military ending up with unnecessary or poorly designed platforms due to congressional pressure. The U.S. Air Force had attempts to retire parts of its C-130 fleet stymied by Congress, despite the service’s insistence that its plans would retain more than sufficient airlift capability, with the congressional delegation from North Carolina expressing concern about reductions at Pope Airfield. A Mississippi senator pushed for the procurement of the USS Hayler to prevent a gap in the Ingalls Pascagoula shipyard’s production line between the end of the Kidd-class program and the start of the Ticonderoga-class acquisition. Sikorsky won the contract to replace the U.S. Navy’s Sea Knight helicopters with helpful pressure from congressional representatives keen to keep the production line going at its site in Connecticut, despite the MH-60S’s tail-wheel design making it difficult to handle when landing on small pads in high winds. However, the littoral combat ship provides the clearest example of this trend, with significant willing participation from the U.S. Navy to boot.

Furthermore, the program exemplifies the practical workings of the military-industrial complex. In choosing two teams to build Flight 0 prototypes, the U.S. Navy widened its base of support within the industry, an incentive that was directly acknowledged in comments made by anonymous Pentagon sources at the time. Each shipyard could call upon its local congressional representatives, in the House and in the Senate, to keep the jobs flowing in their communities. More involved shipyards thus meant more pressure on Congress. Not only did the primes and their partners in each team want to ensure the program’s survival, but the other shipyards like Bath Ironworks did too — they had received other contracts in the FY2005 defense budget to keep them going, but they could also anticipate the possibility of littoral combat ship construction contracts further down the line if the winning seaframe could not be produced solely at its designers’ sites.

Whether one believes the littoral combat ship to be an unmitigated failure or not , its beginnings exemplify the danger in placing too much emphasis on fears about the survival of the defense industrial base. While a lot has changed since 2001, it is easy to imagine the U.S. military making similar mistakes in future programs, and policymakers should beware of the ship’s example. The military-contract treadmill is still running.

Emma Salisbury is a Ph.D. candidate at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her research focuses on defense research and development in the United States and the military-industrial complex. She is also a senior staffer at the U.K. Parliament. The views expressed here are solely her own. You can find her on Twitter @salisbot.

Image: U.S. Navy (Photo by Mass Communication Spc. 1st Class Devin M. Langer)

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News | USS Kingsville, one of the last new Indy-class…

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News | USS Kingsville, one of the last new Indy-class littoral combat ships, passes sea trials, will homeport in San Diego

The 422-foot aluminum-hull trimaran will be commissioned this summer, joining the other 16 lcs that operate out of san diego bay.

The date for the ship’s arrival has yet to be announced.

The Kingsville is a 422-foot aluminum-hull trimaran that is designed to operate in shallow, near-shore waters, primarily to identify and neutralize mines and to conduct maritime security. Indy-class LCS are capable of traveling nearly 50 mph in ideal sea conditions, making them among the fastest vessels in the Navy.

There are currently 16 LCS operating out of San Diego Bay, although two — USS Jackson and USS Montgomery — might be decommissioned in the next year or two.

The Kingsville was built by Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama, where a sister ship, the future USS Pierre , is under construction.

Many LCS will be replaced by the new Constellation-class frigates now under development by the Navy. The first of those vessels won’t be ready until at least 2027.

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Trimaran - 10 Things You Should Know About the Trimaran

• The launch by Austal of the longest multi-hull vessel ever is physical proof that a shipyard has finally found a way to tap the huge potential of a vessel type that was actually invented many centuries ago by the Hawaiians: namely the 'trimaran' or stabilised monohull. We can at last design a vessel for speed and comfort without one (design goal) compromising the other.  
• Austal can make the main (centre) hull long and slender to gain higher speeds with today's engines AND at the same time design the side hulls, which are necessary to make this long hull stable, in a way that means that the roll action of the vessel can be "tuned" for comfort.  
• But the design is complex: of all the shipyards in the world it is only Austal that has proven it has the skills and experience to carry out the development. So many aspects must be taken into account in optimising the design: the number of combinations is almost unlimited.  
• Today catamarans dominate the high speed vessel market around the world: their wide decks, ability to load bow and stern, and their efficiency through the water have meant this very versatile platform accounts for over 70% of all high speed ferries being delivered. Their versatility and economy will mean that catamarans will remain a major part of the market going forward too. But in many cases where a catamaran today plies a route through difficult sea conditions the trimaran will provide a premium service for the discerning operator.  
• The enhanced sea-keeping of the trimaran will help operators offer better service on existing routes plus also begin operations on new routes where, until today, sea conditions had made them too challenging.  

For example, an operator investigating a new route discovers that for sea keeping (passenger comfort) a 100 metre long catamaran is required. This platform has the capacity for 1000 passengers and 250 cars by nature of the large box-style garage deck and superstructure of the catamaran design. The cost of this vessel is proportionate to the volume and power required to operate at high speed (40 knots). Unfortunately the operator does not have the capacity to fill such a vessel so he cannot afford to purchase or operate the 100 metre catamaran. A smaller catamaran i.e. 60-70 metres with the appropriate passenger and car carrying ability will be unable to handle the sea conditions and so will likely lead to the demise of the business through passenger dissatisfaction and cancelled sailings.

With the trimaran design it is now possible to build a 100 metre vessel with the same or better sea keeping as the 100 metre catamaran but without the correspondingly large box-style garage deck and superstructure. The trimaran can effectively be a long slender monohull only with side supports. The car carrying and passenger volume is located only above the centre hull and can be adjusted to equate to that of a 40 to a 100 metre catamaran.

The cost of the vessel therefore becomes proportionate to the desired capacity rather than overall length as the flexible nature of the trimaran design allows construction volume and powering requirements to more closely follow capacity requirements.

The trimaran enables the operator in this example to achieve both the capital investment and sea keeping suited to his particular route.

• Endorsement of the trimaran design has come from the highest possible levels. In the commercial market Fred. Olsen, S.A. is a world leader in developing high speed vessel technologies. It was due to the foresight and determination of Fred. Olsen, S.A. that we see the first (and world's largest) trimaran launched by Austal on September 25, 2004. The 127m long, 30m wide "Benchijigua Express" is a trail-blazing and revolutionary craft.  
• The other major endorsement of the trimaran concept has come from the US Navy who has chosen the Austal trimaran (the team is led by giant US defence contractor, General Dynamics) as one of two vessel types that will go through final design this year and move into production during 2005. The project is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and ultimately the US Navy sees a need for up to 60 of these vessels.  
• The trimaran has already become the basis of a large high speed vehicle ferry and a surface combatant project. Other applications that are already emerging include passenger-only ferries, patrol vessels and supply vessels. In some of these applications the benefits of the trimaran comfort at zero/low speed will also be utilised. The trimaran also has a very low wake-wash and this is a vital characteristic that can be exploited on ferry services close to communities.  
• May 2005 is a big month in the history of high speed transport. Following the delivery from Austal via the Cape of Good Hope the full promise of this technology is shortly to be realised in service.

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Navy Commissions Another Littoral Combat Ship Headed to San Diego

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The U.S. Navy commissioned Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Kingsville — LCS 36 — at the Solomon P. Ortiz Center in Corpus Christi, Texas, on Saturday.

The ship’s homeport will be Naval Base San Diego , where all Navy trimaran variants of the littoral class are based.

Russell Rumbaugh, assistant secretary of the Navy, delivered the commissioning ceremony’s principal address.

“A ship commissioning is one of the ways the U.S. Navy keeps itself tied to the nation it serves,” said Rumbaugh. “And what better moment to celebrate our long and intimate relationship than commissioning a ship named after Kingsville. We in the Department of the Navy are proud of the littoral combat ships.”

The night before commissioning, the Kingsville Commissioning Committee held a reception onboard the USS Lexington Museum where the crew of Kingsville was recognized for their service and dedication.

Kingsville is the first to bear this name and pays homage to the city of Kingsville, Texas, the location of a naval air station, and the King Ranch. The ship’s sponsor is a member of the sixth generation of the King Ranch family, descendants of steamboat captain Richard King, who founded the ranch in 1853.

Independence-variant littoral combat ships integrate with joint combined, manned and unmanned teams to support forward presence, maritime security, sea control, and deterrence missions worldwide. Kingsville is the 18th Independence-variant LCS.

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Why You Want a Trimaran: Pros and Cons of a Trimaran

Three hulls are better than one!  That would be the adage of the trimaran.  It consists of one central hull with two smaller side hulls, called amas.  The average person conceives of the trimaran as something even more extreme than catamarans.  Lighter weight, higher speed, more specialized.  The opposite is actually true; trimarans fill an excellent transition role between monohulls and catamaran.  Recognize the potential applications by understanding the strengths and weakness of the trimaran hullform.

1.0 What Makes a Trimaran

When you seek trimarans, envision stability.  A conventional monohull must balance conflicting needs of resistance and stability.  You want a narrow skinny hull to reduce resistance (and fuel consumption).  But you need a wide hull to maintain vessel stability and keep the ship upright.  The trimaran separates these two design requirements.

In a trimaran, the central hull provides most of the ship buoyancy (90-95% usually).  It does this with a long, narrow hull.  And then the outer hulls, called amas, provide the stability.  This arrangement allows incredible flexibility in the hull design.  Due to the wide separation between hulls, it requires very little buoyancy in the amas to keep the trimaran stable.  That is why many trimarans barely have their amas in the water.  Compare the relative size of the amas vs the main hull in Figure 1‑1.  The amas are just there for stability.

2.0 Advantages

The trimaran offers several capabilities to bridge the gap between monohulls and catamarans:

• Excellent for high speed
• Moderate weight carrying capacity
• Good seakeeping capability
• Larger available deck area
• Moderate space below the main deck

Another advantage is the design of the cross deck (Figure 2‑1) between the main hull and amas.  On a catamaran, this cross deck bridges a large empty gap.  Large gaps add complexity to the engineering and require stronger structures.  We don’t like that.  Stronger structures mean more weight and higher costs.  But the trimaran’s cross deck is much smaller.  It requires less of a gap between hulls, and it does not extend for the entire ship length.  Longitudinal bending is less of a concern for the cross deck.  This greatly simplifies the design of that cross deck, giving us many advantages:

• Heavier loads can be carried on the cross deck
• Less structural weight required for the cross deck
• Deadweight coefficients closer to monohulls

The long length of the center hull also offers great advantages for seakeeping.  This length greatly reduces pitch motions in a wave, and the narrow center hull reduces chances of slamming.  To improve things even more, the side amas reduce roll motions.  They add stiffness to prevent large roll motions.  But they also act to reduce roll accelerations.  All together, trimarans make for gentle seakeeping.

The trimaran offers major advantages for damage survival.  The side amas provide excellent protection to the center hull, which military designers find especially useful.  But the cross deck also helps with damage survival by containing massive reserve buoyancy.  Imagine a damage situation where the ship sinks down to its cross deck.  On a monohull, that would be game over.  But on a trimaran, the cross deck suddenly becomes a barge, easily supporting the entire ship weight.  This reserve buoyancy provides extra peace of mind in yachting applications.

Speaking of peace of mind, let’s talk about a sudden loss of stability.  In catamarans, you lose stability once a single ama completely leaves the water.  Push a catamaran past that point, and stability is a losing battle.  A fact that scares many vessel operators.  Trimarans do not have this problem.  They get stability mainly from submerging the amas.  The center hull always stays in the water, and the leeward ama continues to submerge.  This creates a predictable increase in righting moment.  In normal cases, trimarans never experience the sudden loss of stability.

3.0 Disadvantages

The biggest disadvantage for trimarans is lack of experience.  There are few trimarans in military applications, and even less in commercial use.  That lack of exposure instills wariness in many operators.  I appreciate caution, but don’t let that stop you from realizing the benefits of a trimaran.

Trimarans do have a few genuine detractors.  Due to their complexity, they require some extra design effort.  The cross deck introduces a few extra ways to twist and bend the ship, and the engineers must check each of these extra scenarios.  Finite Element Analysis (FEA) is the ideal tool for this.

Don’t worry about the FEA bill.  You should expect a slight increase, but nothing huge.  FEA was already a part of the design process for normal monohulls.  Most ship designs already require FEA to consider global hull bending.  That means the hard part is already done.  Your engineer already had to build an FEA model of the hull.  With minimal effort, engineers can expand that model to account for the additional design scenarios of a trimaran.

Cost definitely factors into trimaran construction.  The cross deck and extra hulls do add extra steel to the design.  You have to pay for that extra steel as part of the build cost. (Figure 3‑1)  But don’t assume this drastically increases the total build cost.  Adding extra structure is far less expensive than adding extra machinery and power.

Consider the alternative to a trimaran:  an equivalent monohull.  For the monohull, we strip off the side amas and widen the center hull to maintain ship stability.  But bad news.  A wider hull requires a larger engine, and associated support machinery.  In general, the machinery accounts for approximately 50% of the total build cost.  The structure is only around 25-30% of the build cost. [3]  Adding larger machinery costs twice as much as adding extra structure.

4.0 Applications

You see trimarans most often in high speed vessels and the occasional military vessel.

• Car ferries
• Military ships

One of the first experimental military trimarans was the Triton, a steel vessel with a displacement exceeding 1000 MT. [3]  (Figure 4‑1)  These are not little vessels.

Don’t think of trimarans as an expensive hullform.  The prevalence of trimarans with expensive ships is mostly a coincidence.  Imagine if you wanted a high speed ship.  First step is pick a trimaran hullform.  But for high speed, you also build it out of aluminum and load it with powerful engines.  Those are all high priced decisions that get imposed on the trimaran hullform.  The hull shape does not drive the price tag, and trimarans are not limited to high speed.

Aker Arctic even investigated using trimarans as an icebreaking tug. (Figure 4‑2)  Aker found the trimaran configuration especially useful for cutting wide channels through the ice with less power.  Trimarans are just a hull configuration.  How you use the hull is up to you.

5.0 Conclusion

Don’t let the previous trimarans limit your imagination.  The trimaran hullform bridges the gap between monohulls and catamarans.  It offers some advantages of both deadweight capability and larger deck area.  Primarily, trimarans deliver ship stability in a very power efficient package.  What uses can you imagine with that flexibility?

6.0 References

Related posts

Figure 3-1: Icebreaker Healy [4]

Surviving the Arctic: Polar Class Icebreakers

Figure 2-1: Icebreaker Mackinaw in Sea Ice [3]

Ramming the Ice: Icebreaker Propulsion

How to Design a Ship

Stability Letters Explained

Watch CBS News

U.S. military open to escorting Philippine ships in South China Sea amid clashes with China, commander says

Updated on: August 27, 2024 / 7:57 AM EDT / CBS/AP

Manila, Philippines  — The U.S. military is open to the possibility of escorting Philippine ships in the disputed South China Sea , depending on consultations under the allies' 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said Tuesday amid a spike in hostilities between Beijing and Manila in the disputed waters.

Adm. Samuel Paparo's remarks, which he made in response to a question during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Armed Forces chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., provided a glimpse of the mindset of one of the highest American military commanders outside the U.S. mainland on a prospective operation that would risk putting U.S. Navy ships in direct collisions with those of China .

Chinese coast guard, navy and suspected militia ships regularly clash with Philippine coast guard and navy vessels during attempts to resupply Philippine sailors stationed on remote features claimed by both countries. These clashes in the South China Sea have grown increasingly hostile, resulting in injuries among Filipino forces and damage to their ships.

In June, the White House condemned China over what the Philippines called an "intentional high-speed ramming" by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel of a resupply ship in the area that left a Filipino sailor seriously wounded.

"This kind of behavior [by China] is provocative, it's reckless, it's unnecessary, and it could lead to misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to something much bigger and much more violent," U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said.

The Philippine government has faced questions about whether it should consider invoking its treaty alliance with Washington.

Paparo and Brawner spoke to reporters after an international military conference in Manila organized by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, at which China's increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea were spotlighted. Military and defense officials and diplomats from the U.S. and allied countries attended but there were no Chinese representatives.

Asked if the U.S. military would consider escorting Philippine ships delivering food and other supplies to Filipino forces in the South China Sea, Paparo replied, "Certainly, within the context of consultations."

"Every option between the two sovereign nations in terms of our mutual defense, escort of one vessel to the other, is an entirely reasonable option within our Mutual Defense Treaty, among this close alliance between the two of us," Paparo said without elaborating.

Brawner responded cautiously to the suggestion, which could run afoul of Philippine laws including a constitutional ban on foreign forces directly joining local combat operations.

"The attitude of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as dictated by the Philippine laws, is for us to first rely on ourselves," Brawner said. "We are going to try all options, all avenues that are available to us in order for us to achieve the mission…in this case, the resupply and rotation of our troops."

"We will then seek for other options when we are already constrained from doing it ourselves," Brawner said.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said there has been no situation so far that would warrant activating the treaty, which requires the allies to come to the aid of the other if it comes under external attack.

President Biden and his administration have repeatedly renewed their "ironclad" commitment to help defend the Philippines under the 1951 treaty if Filipino forces, ships and aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. said at the conference that China is "the biggest disruptor" of peace in Southeast Asia and called for stronger international censure over its aggression in the South China Sea, a day after China blocked Philippine vessels from delivering food to a coast guard ship at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the contested waters.

Teodoro later told reporters on the sidelines of the conference that international statements of concern against China's increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters and elsewhere were "not enough."

"The antidote is a stronger collective multilateral action against China," Teodoro said, adding that diplomats and defense officials should determine those stronger steps.

Pressed by reporters to be more specific, Teodoro said a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning and ordering a stop to Chinese acts of aggression would be a strong step but acknowledged the difficulty of pursuing that. "The world is not that perfect," Teodoro said.

China, like its geopolitical rival the U.S., is one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and has power to veto such an adversarial step.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has paid "attention" to China's aggressive actions but should do much more, Teodoro said. The 10-nation Southeast Asian bloc includes the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, which have South China Sea claims that overlap with each other, as well as China's and Taiwan 's.

• As tensions with China rise, life goes on in Taiwan

"ASEAN, to remain relevant and credible, cannot continue to ignore what China is doing in the South China Sea," Teodoro said.

In the latest incident in the South China Sea, Philippine officials said China deployed "an excessive force" of 40 ships that blocked two Philippine vessels from delivering food and other supplies to Manila's largest coast guard ship in Sabina Shoal on Monday.

China and the Philippines blamed each other for the confrontation in Sabina, an uninhabited atoll both countries claim that has become the latest flashpoint in the Spratlys, the most hotly disputed region of the South China Sea.

China and the Philippines have separately deployed coast guard ships to Sabina in recent months on suspicion the other may act to take control of and build structures in the fishing atoll. CBS News visited one of the Spratly islands in 2015, and Filipino officials pointed to new islands literally growing out of the sea as China dumped huge amounts of sand and earth into the water. Even then, almost a decade ago, China had created some 2,000 acres of new, artificial islands in the disputed waters, and an airstrip was taking shape on one of them.

The Philippine coast guard said Chinese coast guard and navy ships, along with 31 suspected militia vessels, illegally obstructed the delivery on Monday, which including an ice cream treat for the personnel aboard the BRP Teresa Magbanua as the Philippines marked National Heroes' Day.

The Philippine coast guard said it "remains steadfast in our commitment to uphold national interests and ensure the safety and security of our waters" and urged "the China coast guard to abide with the international law and stop deploying maritime forces that could undermine mutual respect, a universally recognized foundation for responsible and friendly relations among coast guards."

In Beijing, China's coast guard said that it took control measures against two Philippine coast guard ships that "intruded" into waters near the Sabina Shoal. It said in a statement that the Philippine ships escalated the situation by repeatedly approaching a Chinese coast guard ship. The Chinese coast guard did not say what control measures it took.

China has rapidly expanded its military and has become increasingly assertive in pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims virtually in its entirety. The tensions have led to more frequent confrontations, primarily with the Philippines, though the longtime territorial disputes also involve other claimants, including Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

Japan's government separately protested to Beijing on Tuesday, saying that a Chinese reconnaissance plane violated its airspace and forced it to scramble fighter jets.

• South China Sea
• Philippines

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US military open to escorting Philippine ships in the South China Sea, senior admiral says

Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Samuel Paparo says the U.S. military is open to the possibility of escorting Philippine ships in the disputed South China Sea, depending on consultations under the allies’ 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty

MANILA, Philippines -- The U.S. military is open to consultations about escorting Philippine ships in the disputed South China Sea, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said Tuesday amid a spike in hostilities between Beijing and Manila in the disputed waters.

Adm. Samuel Paparo’s remarks, which he made in response to a question during a news conference in Manila with Philippine Armed Forces chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., provided a glimpse of the mindset of one of the highest American military commanders outside the U.S. mainland on a prospective operation that would risk putting U.S. Navy ships in direct collisions with those of China.

Chinese coast guard, navy and suspected militia ships regularly clash with Philippine vessels during attempts to resupply Filipino sailors stationed in parts of the South China Sea claimed by both countries. As these clashes grow increasingly hostile, resulting in injuries to Filipino sailors and damage to their ships, the Philippine government has faced questions about invoking a treaty alliance with Washington.

Paparo and Brawner spoke to reporters after an international military conference in Manila organized by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, at which China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea were spotlighted. Military and defense officials and diplomats from the U.S. and allied countries attended but there were no Chinese representatives.

Asked if the U.S. military would consider escorting Philippine ships delivering food and other supplies to Filipino forces in the South China Sea, Paparo replied, “Certainly, within the context of consultations."

"Every option between the two sovereign nations in terms of our mutual defense, escort of one vessel to the other, is an entirely reasonable option within our Mutual Defense Treaty, among this close alliance between the two of us,” Paparo said without elaborating.

Brawner responded cautiously to the suggestion, which could run afoul of Philippine laws including a constitutional ban on foreign forces directly joining local combat operations.

“The attitude of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as dictated by the Philippine laws, is for us to first rely on ourselves,” Brawner said. “We are going to try all options, all avenues that are available to us in order for us to achieve the mission…in this case, the resupply and rotation of our troops.”

"We will then seek for other options when we are already constrained from doing it ourselves,” Brawner said.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said there has been no situation so far that would warrant activating the treaty, which requires the allies to come to each other's aid if they come under external attack.

President Joe Biden and his administration have repeatedly renewed their “ironclad” commitment to help defend the Philippines under the 1951 treaty if Filipino forces, ships and aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr said at the conference that China is “the biggest disruptor” of peace in Southeast Asia and called for stronger international censure over its aggression in the South China Sea, a day after China blocked Philippine vessels from delivering food to a coast guard ship at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the contested waters.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that “the label of undermining peace can never be pinned on China,” blaming unspecified other actors for “making infringements and provocations in the South China Sea and introducing external forces to undermine the large picture of regional peace and stability.”

Teodoro later told reporters on the sidelines of the conference that international statements of concern against China’s increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters and elsewhere were “not enough."

"The antidote is a stronger collective multilateral action against China,” Teodoro said, adding that a U.N. Security Council resolution would be a strong step, but unlikely given China's security council veto.

He also called for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to do more. The 10-nation Southeast Asian bloc includes the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, which have South China Sea claims that overlap with each other, as well as China’s and Taiwan’s.

"ASEAN, to remain relevant and credible, cannot continue to ignore what China is doing in the South China Sea,” Teodoro said.

In the latest incident in the South China Sea, Philippine officials said China deployed “an excessive force” of 40 ships that blocked two Philippine vessels from delivering food and other supplies to Manila’s largest coast guard ship in Sabina Shoal on Monday.

China and the Philippines blamed each other for the confrontation in Sabina, an uninhabited atoll claimed by both countries that has become the latest flashpoint in the Spratlys, the most hotly disputed region of the South China Sea.

China and the Philippines have separately deployed coast guard ships to Sabina in recent months on suspicion the other may act to take control of and build structures in the fishing atoll.

The Philippine coast guard said Chinese coast guard and navy ships, along with 31 suspected militia vessels, obstructed the delivery, which included an ice cream treat for the personnel aboard the BRP Teresa Magbanua as the Philippines marked National Heroes’ Day on Monday.

In Beijing, China’s coast guard said that it took control measures against two Philippine coast guard ships that “intruded” into waters near the Sabina Shoal. It said in a statement that the Philippine ships escalated the situation by repeatedly approaching a Chinese coast guard ship.

China has rapidly expanded its military and has become increasingly assertive in pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims virtually in its entirety. The tensions have led to more frequent confrontations, primarily with the Philippines, though the longtime territorial disputes also involve other claimants, including Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

Japan’s government separately protested to Beijing on Tuesday, saying that a Chinese reconnaissance plane violated its airspace and forced it to scramble fighter jets.

Associated Press journalists Joeal Calupitan and Aaron Favila in Manila, Ken Moritsugu in Beijing and David Rising in Bangkok contributed to this report.

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China's coast guard is looking even more like its '2nd navy,' with 'Monster' ships, a destroyer-level vessel, and a rumored drone carrier

• China has the world's largest coast guard fleet, and it's still building up on an ambitious scale.
• It's been taking ships from its navy and could be getting its own vessel modeled after a destroyer.
• Experts say the acquisitions mean it's moving closer to being a naval reserve or auxiliary force.

In May, military experts spied a peculiar, half-built vessel sitting among warships at a Shanghai dockyard.

Satellite images showed it had the shape and size of a Type-052D, an advanced guided-missile destroyer in China's navy.

But this ship was missing key features, such as a vertical launch system for missiles and its "Dragon's Eye" radar, a standard system for Chinese warships. Its main gun was also smaller than usual.

One detail stood out above all: the paint job. Chinese navy ships are gray, and this apparent Type-052D came in white — the mark of a coast guard vessel.

The discovery led to speculation, which has since been backed up by local reports , that China's coast guard, a law enforcement agency, was obtaining a ship modeled after a 6,500-ton naval destroyer.

The vessel is just one of several big-ticket acquisitions believed to be destined for the maritime force, which is now at a stage where its capabilities likely carry serious implications if Beijing goes to war with another naval power.

The policing body, moved in 2018 to fall under military command, is undergoing one of the world's most aggressive expansions at a time when the Chinese coast guard is increasingly becoming the center of tensions with its neighbors.

The sheer size and strength of its fleet, estimated at 250 vessels of at least 500 tons each, has led to Western experts often calling it a "second navy."

And it's continued to break ground with bigger and bolder ships. Earlier this month, a state-run shipbuilding institute announced it was preparing an unspecified "mothership" for the high seas, leading to rumors that the coast guard was due to receive a seafaring drone carrier.

In July, China anchored one of its two "Monster" ships — the world's largest-ever coast guard vessels displacing 12,000 tons each — in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. It was an incredible show of power, which Manila accused of being an intimidation tactic.

Experts think Beijing's ambitions for the agency are global. China has made it no secret that it intends to expand its maritime strength for distant operations, establishing a "far-seas protection" doctrine in 2015.

Its coast guard looks poised to play a significant role, John Michael Dahm, a former US Navy intelligence officer and a senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, told Business Insider.

"That the Chinese coast guard would use these new, larger ships and capabilities to establish a security presence farther from China probably has the largest security implications for the US and its allies," Dahm said. "Not just in Asia, but around the world."

Why a destroyer?

China's coast guard expansion isn't happening in isolation. It's locked in a pseudo-arms race with its neighbors in the resource-rich East and South China Seas, chiefly Japan and the Philippines. Both are US allies.

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Beijing has, for decades, already been beefing up its coast guard with dozens of former People's Liberation Army Navy ships, including corvettes that were decommissioned and modified to remove heavy weaponry.

But its rivals have recently started working more closely as tensions mount over regional disputes, most of which China has been accused of initiating.

Manila is upgrading its coast guard with five Japan-made ships worth a total of $400 million, while Tokyo is planning a giant 30,000-ton vessel for its respectable 150-ship policing fleet.

"Size does matter," Dahm said. "A vessel's size and displacement often translate directly into capabilities. A bigger ship means more people, more weapons, more fuel, more endurance, more range."

Western experts think the destroyer-esque ship being assembled in Shanghai is part of China's effort to stay ahead.

"China is upping the ante again by bringing in the most kind of modern, advanced form of a coast guard ship," said Vina Nadjibulla, vice president of research and strategy at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. "We should see it more as a naval ship than a coast guard ship."

From China's perspective, a destroyer-sized ship would fill a gap in its fleet, said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

The coast guard's regular fleet goes up to 4,000 tons, before a dramatic leap to its 12,000-ton "Monster" ships.

Koh said China's "Monster" ship may have been staring down the Philippines in the South China Sea, but it's impractical to station such vessels so far away for extended periods.

"It's expensive to operate and deploy this sort of ship, because it's too big and it's not suited for this purpose," Koh said. "It's meant more as a command ship and a disaster relief platform than to go out there and show force."

A ship modeled after the Type-052D destroyer, at 6,500 tons, could fill that power-projecting purpose, especially if produced in greater numbers, Koh added.

Questions also remain as to what sort of vessel China is planning for its teased coast guard "mothership." Local pundits have guessed it may be a drone carrier or even an aircraft carrier , though the latter is unlikely.

The build-up seems a world away from what's traditionally been understood as the coast guard's role: to police fishermen and deter smugglers.

Japan's coast guard already has five 6,500-ton patrol ships, and if China expands its own agency with vessels of that class, the region is set to be filled by warship-sized boats jockeying for dominance.

For comparison, the US Coast Guard's largest cutters are the size of frigates, at about 4,500 tons.

"Anything the China coast guard does might be considered unprecedented at this point," said Dahm of the Mitchell Institute.

A coast guard that can go to war

One of the most significant developments of a burgeoning Chinese coast guard is that its ships might make a difference in a war.

The US Navy far outstrips Beijing's in raw tonnage and firepower, but it is losing out in the numbers game, with roughly 300 vessels to the Chinese navy's 370. Add a sizable coast guard force, and China stands to far exceed Washington's count.

"They're using quite common baseline hulls as existing PLAN vessels," said Koh. "And that gives us the impression that they're maintaining some level of platform commonality."

That's important, because a common platform leaves open the possibility of adding naval weapons to coast guard ships.

"A coast guard Type-052D might have no vertical launch system on board, but it still has enough deck space to mount weapons," said Koh.

The navy corvettes obtained by the coast guard, for example, might possibly be refitted with their old weapons.

"If they can remove some systems, it means they can be reinstalled in times of conflict," Koh said.

Benjamin Blandin, a researcher and network coordinator at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies, told BI that he's noticed the Chinese coast guard also recently acquired landing craft.

"That's quite bizarre to me. I don't know why a coast guard would ever need landing capacities," he said.

Legally, little stands in the way of China using its coast guard in open conflict. The agency falls under the People's Armed Police, which reports to central military leadership.

Coast guard laws were also changed in 2021 to allow the use of force when China's "sovereign rights and jurisdiction are infringed upon."

"Clearly, they are being treated by the Chinese authorities as a navy reserve or a navy auxiliary," Blandin said.

China's foreign ministry press center did not respond to a request for comment sent by BI.

Ambitions for a global policing force

A key element in China's announcement for its coast guard "mothership" was the phrase "far seas."

Almost nothing has been revealed about the new ship, but Chinese shipbuilders said it's designed to provide "comprehensive support" on long-range missions.

That's a clue that China might intend to send its coast guard on missions far beyond the East and South China Seas, Dahm said.

"For example, in the not-too-distant future, will the Chinese coast guard be patrolling the coast of West Africa to secure Chinese off-shore oil projects?" Dahm said. "What about the CCG offering police services to small island nations in the South Pacific?"

The US Coast Guard has been deploying more frequently to distant regions like Africa , providing training for host countries and security for their waters. Dahm said China could seek to do the same to boost its own influence.

Blandin of YCAPS said sailing under the coast guard also gives China's ships a softer touch in international relations, even if they might be formidable vessels.

"It's not a gray navy hull, it's a white hull. White-hull ships are nice people, right?" he said. "It's just that they use water cannons. It's just that they ram other boats. If they behave in the South Pacific like they behave in the South China Sea, I predict a lot of trouble."

Watch: China shows how it would attack Taiwan as tensions rise

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