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“I will revenge this world with love”

This project is about love and obstacles in its path. The dress serves as the screen for wedding rituals, love’s romantic and dramatic moments taken from Parajanov’s films. The projection is accompanied by the audio mix made of film music and dialogue pieces.

Audio-visual installation

This project is based on the tragic story of Sergei Parajanov’s love to Nigyar, his first wife, who became a victim of traditions. Nigyar, a Muslim girl, born in the family of Moldovan Tatars, was killed by her own family soon after the wedding, because of the religious differences. Parajanov was too poor to ‘buy out’ Nigyar’s life. Such ‘honor killings’ are still widespread among many nations today.

Nigyar’s image stayed with Parajanov forever – as his tragedy, pain, inspiration and shadow. In his films, he repeatedly pictured wedding rituals of various ethnicities, as well as obstacles set by traditional families for beloved ones (‘Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors’, ‘Ashik-Kerib’).

Bride’s white dress is the core element of the installation – a symbol of Parajanov’s love to Nigyar, of the first love in general as well as a ritual element of a girl’s initiation – her symbolic ‘death’ as virgin bride and rebirth as wife.

The dress serves as the screen for wedding rituals, love’s romantic and dramatic moments taken from Parajanov’s films. The projection is accompanied by the audio mix made of film music and dialogue pieces.

Volha Salakheyeva (b. 1984 in Gudermes, Chechnya) – video-artist/VJ, curator, media specialist based in Minsk, Belarus.

Pavel Niakhayeu (b.1978 in Orsha, Belarus) – electronic musician, curator, researcher based in Minsk, Belarus. Lecturer at EHU, Vilnius, Lithuania

More about us: ( VJ Solar Olga & Pavel Ambiont )

Supported by:

This project was created during the art residency “Shadow of Freedom” at the International Parajanov Festival in Levandivka (Ukraine) organized by Lviv City Council’s Department of Culture in partnership with the Adam Mickiewicz Institute in Warsaw, The Ernst Schering Foundation Program and MitOst Association.

Video report from the Parajanov’s Festival 2017 :

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Insurgents Mount Deadly Attack on Chechen Parliament

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• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/insurgents-mount-deadly-attack-on-chechen-parliament

Margaret Warner reports on the violence unleashed by Islamic militants in Russia's southern republic of Chechnya Tuesday. Six were dead and 17 injured in Grozny, the provincial capital, after gunmen and a suicide bomber stormed Parliament.

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Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

GWEN IFILL:

Next: Trouble stirs again in a restless Russian republic. Margaret Warner has our report on the latest turbulence in Chechnya.

MARGARET WARNER:

Russian special forces move room to room in the parliament building in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, today, after three heavily armed Islamist rebels stormed the complex and began killing whomever they found.

One detonated his suicide vest at the gate, killing a policeman. Two others ran into the building and, shouting in Arabic "Allahu akbar," "God is great," opened fire. Security forces counterattacked quickly, holding the death toll to three to six. No parliamentarians died.

The brazen attack was seen as a direct challenge to the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov, a strongman installed by Moscow to rule the volatile southern Russian republic and to suppress its decades-long insurgency.

MIRIAM LANSKOY, Russia and Eurasia program director, National Endowment for Democracy: Moscow is seeing a war that they have not been able to put an end to in a military sense and a political sense.

That's the clear message of today's attacks, says Miriam Lanskoy, an expert on Central Asia and the Caucasus at the National Endowment for Democracy, and co-author of an upcoming book on Chechnya.

MIRIAM LANSKOY:

From the perspective of Moscow and from Moscow's appointed president, Ramzan Kadyrov, the war is over. In the broadest sense, what they have done is show everyone that, indeed, the Chechen resistance is still active and is still able to mount attacks.

Today, Russia's interior minister, who was visiting Grozny, insisted the government was firmly in control and that the Chechen rebellion had been nearly decapitated.

RASHID NURGALIYEV, Russian Interior Minister (through translator):

I would like to say that an operational situation of this kind is extremely rare. Why? Because it is stable and secure here. And on guard here are the police officers of the Chechen republic.

But stability and security are hardly the norm Chechnya now, nor in the broader North Caucasus region of predominantly Muslim states, which includes neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Despite the interior minister's confident words, violence in the North Caucasus has been on the upswing over the past two years, waged by Islamist rebels bent on challenging Russian primacy there. It wasn't supposed to be this way.

Russia fought two brutal wars in the '90s against Chechen drives for independence. But, even after Moscow declared victory in mid-2000, terrorism continued. Chechens were behind a 2002 hostage siege of a Moscow theater that killed more than 100.

In 2004, Chechens took 1,100 schoolchildren and adults hostage in Beslan in North Ossetia. More than 330 died in the frontal assault to free them. And, this past March, terror revisited Moscow. Two female suicide bombers blew up a train station there, killing some 40 people.

Responsibility for the Moscow subway bombing was claimed by this man, Doku Umarov, a Chechen resistance leader who in this recent video posted online called for the caliphate of the Northern Caucasus. But Lanskoy believes today's attack was the work of a rival faction.

There has been a competition brewing among the Chechen commanders for several months. It's clear that Doku Umarov, who has been their leader, is being challenged by several others. This attack is their way of saying that they are the real force among the resistance in Chechnya, as opposed the him.

Perhaps more ominously, the nature of the Chechen resistance has morphed over the decade. The Chechen rebels of the '90s had conventional resistance aims.

Their goal was a Chechen independent state. That state had borders. It would participate in the U.N., similar to the independent states that emerged from the Soviet Union.

The goal of the Chechen insurgents today is quite something else.

So, what is their aim?

It's an aspiration. It's a dream.

The dream of an Islamic state?

Yes, it's — it — but one that is quite beyond Chechnya, that is regional, to build a Caucasus emirate which will have no borders.

It may seem a far-fetched dream on the relatively peaceful streets of Grozny today, but it's an aspiration that promises instability for some time to come.

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The War That Continues to Shape Russia, 25 Years Later

Haunting images show how the first Chechen war humiliated post-Soviet Russia, exposed its weakness, strengthened hard-liners and enabled the rise of Vladimir V. Putin.

Chechen fighters running past dead Russian soldiers in Grozny in January 1995. Credit... Patrick Chauvel

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By Andrew Higgins

• Published Dec. 10, 2019 Updated March 26, 2022

MOSCOW — It began not so much as an invasion, but as a slouching stumble through mud and snow by frightened, ill-fed Russian conscripts, the hollowed-out remnants of a force that, before the collapse of the Soviet Union just three years earlier, had been the mighty Red Army.

But the Russian troops who advanced from three directions into the rebellious region of Chechnya on Dec. 11, 1994, carried history-changing forces that have since reshaped Russia and the world.

The Russian attack, initially in staggering disarray but then increasingly organized and brutal, signaled not just the start of the First Chechen War — a merciless conflict that killed tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians — but also the end of Russia’s liberal dream.

It was a turning point that tilted Russia toward the rule of President Vladimir V. Putin, now in power for two decades. At the time, Mr. Putin was an unknown municipal official in St. Petersburg, but five years later he became master of the Kremlin, propelled there by yet another Chechen war.

Anatoly Shabad, a former physicist and prominent pro-democracy politician in the early 1990s, visited Chechnya repeatedly in 1994, first to try to prevent war and then to halt the killing once it started.

Holed up in the basement of the presidential palace in Grozny, the Chechen capital, as Russian forces launched a disastrous, all-out assault on the city on New Year’s Eve 1994, Mr. Shabad emerged in the morning to find streets strewn with the corpses of Russian soldiers and their burned-out tanks.

Despite the Grozny debacle and many others, Mr. Shabad said, security and military officials who had pushed for the war — known as “siloviki,” or men of force — came out on top, regaining much of the influence they had lost to democratic forces after the Soviet Union imploded in 1991.

“The siloviki were the losers on the ground but they acquired power. The time of democratic transformation passed and society returned to its old state of mind,” Mr. Shabad, now retired from politics, recalled.

When President Boris N. Yeltsin, Russia’s first elected leader, announced 25 years ago that he would “employ all means at the state’s disposal” to crush Chechen demands for independence, he expected to subdue the Chechens with a swift show of overwhelming force.

The hope and expectation was that Russia would repeat the success that the United States military had in Haiti, which it had invaded in September 1994 to swiftly remove a military dictatorship.

Instead, the Chechen war dragged on for nearly two years and achieved none of Russia’s principal aims other than the death of the region’s despotic leader, Dzokhar Dudayev, who was killed in April 1996 by a laser-guided Russian missile.

The war reduced Grozny, a modern, multiethnic city, to a rubble-strewn wasteland reminiscent of Stalingrad in World War II, and shredded Russia’s post-Soviet image as a peaceful democracy. It also set up a second war in 1999 that helped convince Mr. Yeltsin — ill, often drunk and never fully recovered from the trauma of the first war — to hand over power to Mr. Putin on the eve of the new millennium.

The horrific brutality of the conflict turned what began as a secular nationalist movement in Chechnya into a cause increasingly colored by militant Islam, with many fighters viewing their battle against Russia as part of a global jihad.

Money and fighters poured in from the Middle East during the later stages of the war, turning Chechnya into a breeding ground for the violent ideology of Al Qaeda.

The 1994-96 war was freighted with foreboding from the start, with many of Mr. Yeltsin’s most stalwart supporters and senior military figures warning of disaster.

“It will be a blood bath, another Afghanistan,” predicted Gen. Boris Gromov, the deputy defense minister, who had led the last Soviet troops home from that country in February 1989. The deputy commander of Russia’s ground force resigned in protest.

Like the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the first Chechen war ended in a stalemate. Russia pulled out after signing a peace accord that left Chechnya’s ultimate status undecided but essentially gave the region the self-rule that Moscow had gone to war to prevent.

And like the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Russian departure from Chechnya left a devastated land that quickly descended into lawless strife among rival factions.

While the Afghan war had pushed the Soviet Union toward collapse, the Russian Federation survived the Chechen debacle. But it was utterly humiliated and fundamentally reshaped.

That made the ascent of a strongman like Mr. Putin, a former K.G.B. agent who vowed to restore order and avenge Russia’s defeat in Chechnya, not only possible but perhaps also inevitable.

The 1994 invasion “was a real crossing of the Rubicon for Russia,” said Thomas de Waal, a British expert on the Caucasus who co-wrote “Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus,” a classic book on the conflict, with Carlotta Gall, now a reporter with The New York Times.

The war, he said, “sucked the whole country into a violent nightmare” as soldiers, mostly ill-trained conscripts, were thrown into the caldron.

“The hawks lost the war but won power,” Mr. de Waal said.

The official Russian military death toll was nearly 6,000, but most independent estimates put the real figure at perhaps twice that or more. The number of civilian deaths has been estimated at between 30,000 and 100,000.

Mr. Yeltsin’s decision to send troops into Chechnya was initially billed as a straightforward exercise to “restore constitutional order” and reverse the declaration of an independent state.

But as with subsequent Russian military interventions, notably in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, the war began with an elaborate subterfuge orchestrated by Russian intelligence.

Fifteen days before the main invasion, dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers poured into Chechnya, in what was presented as a push by Chechen opposition groups to topple Mr. Dudayev. The attack fit into a Russian narrative — repeated today in eastern Ukraine — that Moscow was simply a bystander in a local conflict.

But this story quickly unraveled, when Chechen fighters halted the advance, captured tank crews, revealed them to be Russian, and paraded them before Russian and foreign journalists.

Mr. Shabad, who visited Grozny in late November 1994 with other Russian lawmakers, said it was immediately obvious that official denials of Russian involvement were lies.

“They pretended that the Chechens were just fighting among themselves,” he said, “but the whole thing was organized by Russia, mainly the F.S.K.,” the domestic intelligence agency that succeeded the K.G.B., with the connivance of the military.

Andrei Rusakov, an army captain among the 20 or so Russians captured, told how he had signed a secret contract in which the F.S.K. — now called the F.S.B. — offered him several thousand dollars to take part in the phony Chechen opposition attack.

The revelation of the security service’s failure prompted public gloating by Russia’s military. Pavel S. Grachev, the defense minister, stated on television that the armed forces could have taken control of Chechnya with “one paratroop regiment in a couple of hours.”

His boast quickly came back to haunt him, when Mr. Yeltsin ordered the military to invade. The disastrous performance of the armed forces made Mr. Grachev perhaps the most reviled man in Russia, amid accusations that he had pushed for a military solution simply to disperse the whiff of corruption around him and his ministry.

After the failed New Year’s Eve attack on Grozny, Russian forces pounded it relentlessly from the air, an orgy of destruction that Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany denounced as “sheer madness.” The Russians finally captured the city, but as the war ground on amid horrendous brutality on both sides, Chechens recaptured it the following year, and laid siege to Russian forces in other major towns.

In August 1996, Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, Mr. Yeltsin’s national security adviser, reached an agreement with the Chechens to stop the fighting. Mr. Yeltsin, increasingly infirm, erratic and under siege politically, initially balked at the deal, which effectively acknowledged Russia’s defeat, but ultimately endorsed it.

“The main thing,” he said, “is that bloodshed has been stopped.”

Produced by Gaia Tripoli.

Andrew Higgins is the bureau chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. Previously a correspondent and bureau chief in Moscow for The Times, he was on the team awarded the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting, and led a team that won the same prize in 1999 while he was Moscow bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal.  More about Andrew Higgins

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